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Human Agency in Disaster Planning: A Systems Approach
John Hamer Powell ,1,∗ Michael Hammond,2 Albert Chen,3 and Navonil Mustafee1
Current approaches to risk management place insufficient emphasis on the system knowledge
available to the assessor, particularly in respect of the dynamic behavior of the system under
threat, the role of human agents (HAs), and the knowledge available to those agents. In this
article, we address the second of these issues. We are concerned with a class of systems con-
taining HAs playing a variety of roles as significant system elements—as decisionmakers, cog-
nitive agents, or implementers—that is, human activity systems. Within this family of HAS,
we focus on safety and mission-critical systems, referring to this subclass as critical human ac-
tivity systems (CHASs). Identification of the role and contribution of these human elements
to a system is a nontrivial problem whether in an engineering context, or, as is the case here,
in a wider social and public context. Frequently, they are treated as standing apart from the
system in design or policy terms. Regardless of the process of policy definition followed, anal-
ysis of the risk and threats to such a CHAS requires a holistic approach, since the effect of
undesirable, uninformed, or erroneous actions on the part of the human elements is both po-
tentially significant to the system output and inextricably bound together with the nonhuman
elements of the system. We present a procedure for identifying the potential threats and risks
emerging from the roles and activity of those HAs, using the 2014 flooding in southwestern
England and the Thames Valley as a contemporary example.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This is the second of a series of articles(1–3)
concerned with the identification and assessment
of system risk as part of the process of identifying
appropriate policies for the control and mitigation of
risks under inevitably limited resource availability.(4)
The focus is on safety and mission-critical systems,
particularly those that contain human agents (HAs)
whose decisions and actions form an inextricable
part of the system assets, but noncritical systems also
benefit potentially from our approach. We refer to
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this class of systems as critical human activity systems
(CHASs). Examples are air traffic and shipping
control, railway network management, health-care
systems, and infrastructure systems (infrasystems),
such as electrical distribution and flood control.(5)
We distinguish between the physical infrasystem,
the interactions of the HAs participating in that
infrasystem, and the policy subsystem around it.
We have observed elsewhere(1) that there are
four shortcomings in existing approaches to the sys-
tematic identification of risk,(6–18) namely:
(1) A reluctance to mobilize what is known about
the dynamics of the system in focus and, in par-
ticular, the causal mechanisms experienced by
and understood by the managers and inhabi-
tants of that system.
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(2) A lack of a structured approach to the analysis
of the risk presented and managed by the HAs
in a CHAS.
(3) A paucity of attention in risk analysis to the
knowledge (as distinct from information) de-
ployed by those HAs.
(4) An inability effectively to take into considera-
tion the multiplicity of viewpoints, system defi-
nitions, and valuations of various stakeholders.
In this article, we concentrate on the second of
these points, deploying a technique well known in
more general strategic analysis and emerging from
the system dynamics community, to assist in the iden-
tification of risk mechanisms in a way that explicitly
includes the involvement and actions of individuals
and groups inhabiting and associated with the system
in focus.
To illustrate the method, we model the flood
events of the 2013/2014 Somerset Levels in southwest
England, using a modeling architecture that covers
the physical infrasystem, the social valuation context,
and the policy surround.(1)
1.1. Definitions, General Approach, and Scope
of Article
1.1.1. Role of HAs in CHASs
CHASs, by definition, are systems subject to
management where the HAs are entwined with a
physical substrate, known as the infrasystem. Their
interactions with this infrasystem are manifold.
They can be passive recipients of system behavior,
observers and commentators on that behavior, or
indeed components of it, since they can be pro-
grammatic or conscious decisionmakers, responding
to knowledge or information inputs and taking
action. Of course, as decision-making system com-
ponents they are subject to irrationality, bounded
rationality,(19,20) and other sources of unpredictabil-
ity. Nevertheless, within the CHAS they are compo-
nents whose inputs and outputs are linked with other
human and infrasystem components. For example, to
the extent that the citizens of a flooded area control
run-off resources as flood risk increases, they open
or shut sluices, barriers, and drains according to their
own judgment, acting as responsive system compo-
nents in a way familiar to all system designers.4
4The system engineer’s common description of humans as “wet-
ware,” in linguistic resonance with software, firmware, and hard-
ware, has a certain irony in this example.
Lastly, they can be system owners and managers,
implying a degree of autonomy over the policies en-
acted within the system and, by extension, the defini-
tion of the system itself.
1.1.2. Ontology
Before proceeding to provide further clarity of
these different roles (to make sense of the extensive
literature on the interaction of HAs with CHASs), it
is appropriate to note an ontological difficulty deriv-
ing from the presence of humans in the system itself.
The effect of this is to render the ontology of the sys-
tem socially constructed (at least in part), as distinct
from the conveniently positivist assumptions that can
be made about the infrasystem. We have observed
elsewhere(1) that there are three intersecting subsys-
tems in CHASs—namely, the infrasystem, the social
subsystem in which it is embedded, and the political
subsystem that, eponymously, produces the policy
on which basis the system is resourced and judged.
Table I shows the different ontologies of these
subsystems.
We see, then, that at least part of the system in
focus is multiply defined by its participants. This re-
quires a multiple representation and hence parallel
analyses of the different system definitions, and we
delay treatment of this well-known general systems
problem(21) for the case of risk identification until a
later paper. For the moment, we adopt the stance of a
detached observer, where we attempt to capture the
varying views of the participants by expanding the
system representation to include different hypothe-
ses. We will see several dilemmas of policy emerging
from this treatment of the different valuations of sys-
tem output and in some cases from different under-
standings of the infrasystem by participants.
1.1.3. Roles of HAs in System
The various roles of the HAs associated with a
CHAS can be characterized by three distinguishing
factors: (1) passivity, the extent to which they are ac-
tive or passive in their role; (2) autonomy, the degree
of autonomy that they possess in their interactions
with the system; and (3) abstraction, being the extent
to which they are acting in the domain of the intangi-
ble or the physical.
Table II shows the various combinations of these
three characterizing factors, from which we can cre-
ate a simple taxonomy of roles.
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Table I. Ontological Assumptions of Component Subsystems
Subsystem Description Ontology Implication
Infrasystem Physical elements of the system in focus
(e.g., hydrology, geography,
hydraulics)
Positivist Can be defined on a single, observed,
essentially undebated basis
Social
subsystem
Interactions of society in which
infrasystem is embedded (e.g., press
commentary, economic effects,
perceptions of flood victims)
Socially constructed and plural
(many valued)
Many participants will differ in their
perceptions, valuations, and even
definitions of the architecture and
scope of the system
Political
subsystem
Surrounding system through which
resources are allocated and overall
system behavior judged (e.g., regional
and national government policy
determination processes)
Socially constructed but
singular
While the process of determining policy
is multivalued, the output (i.e.,
published policy) can be treated as well
defined, albeit mutable
Table II. Taxonomy of HA Roles
Abstraction
Physical Abstracted
Passivity Passive Low autonomy
Victim
Passive recipient of system effects without any channel
of action
Low autonomy
Observer
Detached from system effects but able to observe
without taking action or communication
High autonomy
Inhabitant
Recipient of system effects without channel to action,
but able to remove self from system
High autonomy
Commentator
Detached from system effects but able to publish
commentary and contribute to others’ cognition
Active Low autonomy
Operator
Programmatic interactor with system; not empowered
to change system definition
Low autonomy
Analyst
Observer of system behavior and definition: able to
create cognitive product
High autonomy
Participant
Decision-making operator, able to interact with system,
creating rules; able to redefine system architecture
and enact rules
High autonomy
Policymaker
Able to define system outputs and create valuations;
creates but does not enact rules
These roles can overlap. At the passive, low
autonomy end, a HA we have characterized as vic-
tim, can, of course, also be an observer, and despite
any disempowerment at the physical level may,
conceivably, also be in a position to offer cognitive
input to policymakers as an analyst—a participant
who can also act as a policymaker is in the powerful
position of being able to define the valuation of
system outputs, to alter architecture, and to create
rules and enact them. We might refer to such an
agent as a system-owner.
In these various and diverse roles, as par-
ticipants, inhabitants, valuers, and definers of the
CHAS, the HAs are also originators of risks and
threats, sometimes through purposive action and
sometimes through unconscious action or inaction.
By virtue of their capacity to act sentiently, they are
also risk mitigators and controllers.
1.1.4. Risk Management Process
Risk management in general usage refers to a
process of identification and assessment of the like-
lihood of occurrence and impact of deleterious out-
comes of an object in focus resulting from (potential)
risk events that may or may not be reified in a par-
ticular circumstance. We shall refer to the object of
this analysis as a system, since, for it to be worthy of
consideration, it will be of a complexity greater than
that of a single, undifferentiated event. For example,
one would not perform the risk analysis of a flood
event by considering it as a single, isolated, hydraulic
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phenomenon. It is not the flood in and of itself that is
the subject of analysis, but the effect of the flood on
the environment and society in which it takes place,
accepting, of course, that the physical characteristics
of the event are the root cause of these wider effects.
Risk management as a process, then, moves
from identification and assessment to control, mit-
igation, and consequence management, seeking to
accommodate inevitable resource limitations within
an action plan aimed at satisfying a set of outputs or
consequences of the causative risk event. Frequently,
these action plans present dilemmas, opposing op-
tions for action, which can emerge from a number
of sources. First is the inevitability in a complicated
system that an intervention aimed at a particular
system effect will cause, at the same time, unsought
and unwanted effects. These unsought effects are
an emergent property of the interconnected nature
of the system itself, resulting from the inevitable
interactions of competing or coexisting dynamics
within the system. We distinguish between these
and other unsought effects deriving from some
lack of knowledge of the system. Second is a set of
dilemmas resulting from disagreements about the
desirability of particular system outputs. Third is a
set of dilemmas emerging from different beliefs of
the architecture of the system itself.
We are now in a position to make sense of the
extensive literature on the role of humans in system
behavior (what is often referred to as human factors)
in the specific context of risk identification.
1.2. HAs and Risk
It is clear from a review of both academic and
practice literature that there is a clear acceptance of
the role of human agency in risk management.(22) A
vocabulary in frequent use is that of “human factors”
where the human is seen in various roles, such as the
creator of risk and the manager or mitigator of that
risk. In the role of risk creator (operator in Table I),
there is emphasis on compliance or noncompliance
with safety signals, such as (in railway terminology)
signals passed at danger (SPADs). Here the HA
is seen as an element of the system, but one that
is essentially a switching component.(23) A more
developed position looks at the role of the HA as a
cognitive element (analyst in Table I),(24) for exam-
ple, as the supervisor of a shipping control system or
an aircraft. In the latter domain, the volume of work
by aviation medicine institutes in many countries is
very large.(25) Here the emphasis is on the ability
of the HA to make sense of situations, thereby
creating an internal problem (a cognitive act) that is
then “solved” (more accurately “responded to”) by
appeal to a preformed set of responses. There is little
present in this literature in the way of rule creation
(participant in Table I). We are critical of the ten-
dency in this literature to generalize the context of
the HAs (seen as operators or participants), rather
than dealing with the specifics of the system they in-
habit and, specifically, the specific interactions of the
HAs with that system. This is not to say that general
advice on, for example, cognitive stress arising from
workload is not useful.(23) It is more that the focusing
of that advice within the context of a particular
system will make it more effective. Moreover, we
argue that a generalized approach is inefficient
because the consequences of cognitive failure (as a
continuing example) are much more severe in one
system environment than another.(26) For example,
a fast-moving single-operator context, such as that
of a single-seat combat aircraft, requires different
cognitive support compared with that of a submarine
control room, where cross-comparison and co-
production of the cognitive product can be made by
a number of HAs over a more generous time scale.
A second, but related literature is that of human-
machine cooperation.(27) Here the emphasis is on de-
signing the interfacing of the human operator with
the machine (usually limited in definition to a com-
puter). Bearing in mind the importance of such de-
signmatters, it is not surprising that the literature and
underlying work is extensive and well-funded. Again,
much of the work focuses on general design princi-
ples rather than risk analysis specific to a particular
system and falls short in terms of the specific analysis
of the role, contribution, and effects of the HA.(28–30)
We find little in the way of study of the complex
ontologies discussed briefly above; the empha-
sis is almost completely upon the infrastructure,
thereby, in our view overfocusing on what is
controllable, in design terms, rather than on the
debatable/negotiable/indeterminate content of the
other two ontological domains. While there is some
prior work in the area of society models,(31) for
example, this again tends towards the generalized
rather than the specific.
System approaches to the analysis of risk are
numerous, often advocating a general system ap-
proach where interventions and effects are seen to
be multiply connected and where, as consequence,
mitigating interventions need to be made with
the understanding that unwanted and unexpected
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side-effects may/will result.(32–37) One or two sources
have, indeed, applied this general understanding
to environmental(38) and even flood risk analyses,
specifically.(39) There is some existing use of system
dynamics within risk analysis, both in a general
sense,(40,41) for the purposes of validation(42) and as
a support for the cognitive process so central to risk
analysis.(43)
System approaches and system dynamics (as a
particular technique), then, are well-respected ap-
proaches in the risk analysis literature, and yet our
search of relevant articles adumbrates little in the
way of operationalization of these concepts. Our con-
tribution does not lie, therefore, in the introduction
of system concepts to risk analysis. We do not seek,
either, to claim an improvement in the product of the
human factors or even the human-machine cooper-
ation approaches in and of themselves. Rather, our
article seeks to improve the effectiveness of risk anal-
ysis in two complementary areas—namely, (1) the
operationalization of a system-based method of as-
sessing risk in particular systems, by the inclusion of
specific human agency, and (2) the extension of the
scope of this form of risk assessment into CHASs, re-
quiring a sensitivity to the three ontologies discussed
above.
1.3. General Approach
The essential requirement, then, that emerges
from the intersection of the realities of HAS oper-
ation and the approaches taken by practicing risk
managers is to provide a methodology that links the
effective generalities of the human factors approach
and the specifics of risk assessment for a particular
system.
The method we have developed, to this end, con-
sists of the following steps:
(1) System modeling: Usually in discussion with
informants in a focus group or groups, a
qualitative system dynamics (QSD) model is
constructed,(44) covering the three subsystems
of Table I.
(2) Attribution of HAs: The QSD model, again
in consultation with appropriate informants, is
populated, arrow by arrow, with sets of actors
(or agents) who, in respect of the causal con-
nection implicit in the arrow, have an effect
either on the strength of that connection, or
its speed of operation.(45) These agents can be
individuals, groups of individuals without for-
mal identity, or functional groupings possess-
ing formal identities such as “The Police” or
“City Hall.”
(3) Assessment of loop dynamics: By inspection,
the dominant loops are identified, being those
that have the greatest predicted effect on the
overall system behavior. These are character-
ized and prioritized for this analysis according
to the speed and strength of their contribution
to overall system performance.(1,44)
(4) Threat identification: By consideration of the
role, motivation, and capacity for effect of
each HA in each relevant link in the key loops,
the potential for each agent to affect system
output is assessed. By consideration of the
channel to action (i.e., the dynamic mechanism
that would be affected by the HA’s action)
threat mechanisms are identified. Although
it forms no part of the procedure elucidated
here, consideration of the motivations of HAs
in the context of their capacity for and channel
to action provides some basis for a probability
judgment of the likelihood of intervention of
each HA in respect of each relevant interac-
tion mechanism.
(5) Mitigation identification: Appropriate limiting
actions are identified to minimize the effect or
likelihood of the threats identified at stage 4.
(6) The identification of specific policy dilemmas
has proved useful in practice. These potential
conflicts of resource allocation or policy ef-
fects derive from a variety of sources, includ-
ing diversity of system definition, diversity of
effect valuation, the coexistence of competing
hypotheses of behavior, and resource compe-
tition.
The key steps in this procedure are stages 4, 5,
and 6, the earlier steps being well known in the QSD
literature.(46) In these latter three steps, considera-
tion of three aspects come together, namely, the sys-
tem dynamics, the role and positioning of the human
actors in that system, and the motivations of those ac-
tors. This concatenation of context, agent, and (plu-
ral) objectives, particularly within the specifics of a
system, provides an enhanced support to the exten-
sive general capabilities of existing approaches to hu-
man factors in risk studies.
1.3.1. Contribution and Utility of the Work
The main contribution of the technique we pro-
pose in this article, then, is in the identification of
the interactions of HAs with a CHAS, particularly
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in respect of the risks confronting the system and its
managers. Our technique puts specific emphasis on
agent-based analysis. It is appropriate, therefore, to
compare it with the numerical evaluation of a sys-
tem using agent-based approaches and agent-based
simulation (ABS) in particular. ABS has widespread
application in the context of several CHASs, such
as healthcare and emergency planning and evacua-
tion, as well as agent-based social simulations. It is a
simulation technique that models the overall behav-
ior of a system through the use of autonomous sys-
tem components (agents) that communicate through
the exchange of messages. The behavior associated
with an agent determines its role in the environment,
its interaction with other agents, its response to mes-
sages from other agents, and whether its own behav-
ior is adaptable.(47) Thus, in agent-based simulation
the role and interactions of the agents are predefined
and limited in extent compared with the self-defining
HAs of our approach.
For the example of the flood case of this article,
identification of the different categories of HAs (such
as local farmers, environmental agencies, press and
media) and their relationships with the system is vi-
tal prior to the development of an ABS model. The
qualitative politicized influence diagram (QPID) ap-
proach allows us to do this through the systematic
identification of the specific roles of the HAs within
the dynamic structures of the system.(44,45) Although
this is not the focus of this article, such an approach
allows the effects of the HAs upon the system out-
puts to be systematically identified so that policy op-
tions available for the management of those risks can
be illuminated. In turn, since the role of the HAs
in introducing, controlling, managing, and mitigating
risk can be better understood, better, more broadly
understood system design and requirements capture
can result.
The approach here differs from fault-tree or
event-tree analysis methods, with which risk practi-
tioners may be more familiar. Event trees or fault
trees are both types of logic trees that relate a se-
ries of connected events to their consequences, and
attach probabilities to estimate risk as a combination
of probability and consequences.(34) The key differ-
ence between event- and fault-tree analyses is the di-
rection of the logic. An event tree starts with an ini-
tiating event, and uses inductive logic to assess the
onwards consequences. Molinari and Handmer(48)
adopted an event-tree analysis to assess how humans
would respond to a flood warning, accounting for
whether an individual would trust or understand such
a warning. A fault tree, in contrast, uses deductive
logic, placing the unwanted consequence as the initi-
ating event, and works backward to identify the nec-
essary conditions.(49)
The advantage with the systems approach
posited in this article is the ability to represent hu-
man behavior as part of the infrasystem, and how it is
affected by feedbacks, both positive and negative. It
also demonstrates the interdependencies among vari-
ous subsystems, which are often interactive processes
that cannot be described in unidirectional decision-
tree approaches. To give a simple example, the be-
havior of an individual within the infrasystem will
be affected by his or her prior experience. Both
fault- and event-tree analyses adopt a linear logic ap-
proach, which does not capture the dynamic nature
of human behavior within the infrasystem. To over-
come this weakness, some researchers have adopted
hybrid approaches in disaster risk analysis and man-
agement. The resulting approach can be complex and
unwieldy.(50) The systems approach proposed here
can capture the dynamic interactions within the in-
frasystem, while retaining a relative simplicity of ex-
position.
1.4. Choice of Case
To illustrate the general method described
above, we have chosen a major flooding event expe-
rienced in southwest England during the winter of
2013/2014. In addition to being well documented, the
flooding exhibits many of the characteristics typical
of CHASs; it shows clear interaction among the
three subsystems, a series of opposing viewpoints de-
riving from the actions and perceptions of the HAs,
observable threats or risks, and a clear set of policy
or action dilemmas, deriving from differing hypothe-
ses about system architecture, differing valuations
of system outputs, and the inevitable emergence
of unwanted or unexpected effects of a system
intervention aimed at achieving a particular desired
effect.
1.4.1. Risk Identification within Flood Risk
Management
Risk identification and assessment in flood risk
management specifically is a complex process involv-
ing expertise from various disciplines and combining
different data sources, models, and information. An-
alysts typically define flood risk as the combination
of the chance of a particular event, together with the
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impact that the event would cause if it occurred.(51)
This can be operationalized as a function of hazard,
exposure, and vulnerability.(52)
Flooding highlights the importance of CHASs,
since its impacts, economic costs, and risk to life
are strongly dependent on human actions taken
operationally both during and prior to the events
themselves.(53) Indeed, the events themselves are the
result of a series of human decisions taken over cen-
turies, as exemplified in the case in hand of the flood-
ing in Somerset, a low-lying county in the United
Kingdom, in 2013.(54)
Within the field of flood risk management, risk
identification and assessment is typically undertaken
in four stages: (1) hazard identification and assess-
ment; (2) exposure assessment; (3) vulnerability as-
sessment; and (4) risk assessment.
Hazard assessment seeks to identify and evalu-
ate the source of danger. Flooding is not a single
phenomenon, but it can arise from extreme flows
that exceed river capacities (fluvial flooding), in-
tense rainfall that exceeds the capacity of drainage
infrastructure (pluvial flooding), storm surges that
lead to coastal flooding, and high groundwater lev-
els or any combination of such factors.(55) A signif-
icant shortcoming of risk identification within flood
risk management is the inability to consider differ-
ent sources of flood hazard and their co-occurrence.
These characteristics can include infrasystem vari-
ables such the depth, velocity, rate of rise, the oc-
currence of any pollutants, and contributing factors
from the social and political subsystems. Further-
more, the characteristic that causes danger will vary
among different groups, assets, and systems. There
is a high degree of interaction between HAs and
the physical infrasystem, producing a variety of both
wanted and undesirable, planned and unexpected
outcomes.
Once the source of flood risk is identified, the as-
sessment of flood risk typically continues with an as-
sessment of the flood hazard, and the application of
computational models, which can broadly be classi-
fied as meteorological, hydrological, and hydraulic.
Meteorological models aim to simulate the particu-
lar conditions that give rise to extreme rainfall or
low pressures that can cause storm surges, leading
to coastal flooding.(56) Hydrological models are used
to simulate the amount of runoff that could be gen-
erated because of these weather conditions.(57) Hy-
draulic models then represent the movement and
storage of water through an environment, providing
information on typical depths and velocities. Such
models can be used on large, global scales(58) or at
fine, urban scales.(59) It is worth noting the clear em-
phasis placed in such studies upon the physical infras-
tructure variables as opposed to the role of human
agency in creating and mitigating or amplifying the
risks.
The next stage is to evaluate the consequences
of flooding, which involves an understanding of expo-
sure (what assets and systems are in harm’s way), and
their vulnerability (the extent of the damage caused
if these systems are inundated). The former relies
on a reliable knowledge of the location of people,
assets, and infrastructure, which can be represented
in geographical information systems,(60) but we note
here that the primary role of the HAs is that of vic-
tims rather than being in any participatory relation.
Assessing their vulnerability is complex. The vulner-
ability of communities to flooding requires a thor-
ough understanding of relationships, support net-
works, and various intangible factors, but critically
this is not carried out using explicit connection be-
tween individuals, formal and informal groups, and
the risk dynamics, and is dominated by narrow con-
siderations of the infrasystem behavior, thus under-
estimating the importance of both the political and
social subsystems. Typically, the assessment of dam-
age to fixed residential assets is carried out using
flood damage functions that relate the characteristics
of the flood (usually depth) to the damage cost for
different asset types.(61)
Finally, the risk can be determined by com-
bining these predictions of event likelihood and
effect into an integrated expectation measure,
normally expressed as an expected annual damage
(EAD).(62)
A significant problem in flood risk identification
and assessment is in understanding indirect effects
that arise through the interruption of supply chains
or the failure of critical infrastructure, each of which
is subject to human agency. Improved assessment of
these factors requires improved knowledge of the
systems subject to the flooding, and the role of hu-
mans as agents. Only in recent years are researchers
beginning to develop methodologies that incorporate
system approaches to consider the knock-on effects
on critical infrastructures.(63,64)
We will see these various roles of HAs and ac-
tors in the example case chosen, namely, the flood-
ing events in SW England (and by extension into the
Thames Valley, a prosperous area west of London).
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1.5. The Somerset Levels Floods, Winter 2013/2014
1.5.1. Situation and Context
The Somerset Levels are a low-lying saucer-
shaped depression of some 650 km2 in extent in
southwest England containing a few “islands” of
higher ground such as the well-known Glastonbury
Tor. There are several villages and small towns, con-
taining around 800 dwellings.
The area has been farmed for many hundreds of
years and has been subject to winter flooding for that
entire period, the first recorded flood event being in
1607 with some 2,000 fatalities. With more intensive
farming and an increase in population, the effects
of flooding have been amplified in recent decades,
both in terms of intensity of the floods and in their
effects on the inhabitants. Storms during the winter
of 2013/2014 caused extensive flooding in the Levels
that, together with later flooding events in the pop-
ulous Thames Valley, just west of London, precipi-
tated emergency action on the part of the U.K. En-
vironment Agency (UKEA) and other responsible
bodies such as DEFRA, the U.K. Government De-
partment for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
The Levels are drained by a number of rivers
flowing into the Bristol Channel to the north, which
has a notably high tidal range of some 14 m at spring
tides. The tides cause diurnal hydraulic blockages
that have effects back upstream. There are some tidal
gates allowing gravitational draining at low tide and
facilities for pumping over earth banks.
1.5.2. Brief Chronology(65–72)
22 Dec 2013 Cyclone Dirk hits the United King-
dom. Somerset Levels flooding begins.
23 Dec Network Rail, responsible for national
rail infrastructure, describes the dam-
age to the rail network in southern
England as worse than that seen during
the St. Jude storm in October. Local-
ized flooding in southern England, as
the storm brought up to 60 mm of rain
to theUnited Kingdom.Major incident
declared in the region of Thames Val-
ley. One-hundred thousand homes re-
ported without power across southern
England.
3 Jan 2014 Strong winds and high tides bring
flooding to large parts of western Eng-
land, Wales, and Scotland. River Par-
rett, a main drainage outlet, overflows.
Demands for resumption of dredging.
24 Jan Sedgemoor District Council and Som-
erset County Council declare a “major
incident” in flooded areas as forecast-
ers warn of more rain; 7,000 hectares
in the Levels have been underwater for
more than one month.
25 Jan Trees are uprooted and structural dam-
age caused to buildings by lightning as
a heavy rainstorm hits the U.K. Mid-
lands region.
27 Jan Visit by Environment Secretary. PM
subsequently confirms dredging will
occur in Levels.
30 Jan Figures released by the Met Office in-
dicate southern England and parts of
the Midlands have experienced high-
est January rainfall since records began
in 1910. Military personnel prepare to
help residents in flooded areas of Som-
erset.
3 Feb Reports of minor looting result in
mounted police being deployed.
4 Feb HRH Prince Charles visits. Local MP
raises profile by personal abuse of
Head of Environment Agency.
5 Feb Part of the sea wall carrying the rail-
way line linking London with the west
of England is washed away by a power-
ful storm. Thousands of homes are left
without electricity. PM announces an
extra £100 million will be spent U.K.-
wide on dealing with the aftermath of
the floods.
6 Feb The Ministry of Defence sends around
40 Royal Marines to the Somerset Lev-
els to help with flood protection as
more storms are expected. The govern-
ment also provides an extra £30 mil-
lion for repairs. Local action group
FLAG set up to provide a channel of
communication between system inhab-
itants and policymakers.
8 Feb Large areas of England and Wales un-
der flood warnings as another storm
arrives. The Somerset Levels are the
worst affected area. Rail links to south-
west England are again cut off by the
storms.
9 Feb Thames Valley floods. Major incident
declared. Army mobilized to support.
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10 Feb Support from locally-based Royal
Marines arrives at the Levels. Major
conurbation of Bridgwater partially
flooded. Over 600 houses flooded.
Major disruptions to trains on the
Bristol to Exeter main train line, a
critical physical communication asset.
11 Feb U.K. PrimeMinister orders that “polit-
ical bickering” should end.
21 Feb Giant pumps from the Netherlands be-
come effective in lowering the level in
King’s Sedgemoor Drain.
22 Feb Reports of vandalization of temporary
flood barriers.
26 Feb Northmoor pumping station is in-
stalled.
27 Feb Environment Secretary visits the Lev-
els. Subsequent commitments to fur-
ther £60m investment in pumping
27 March Levels declared free of floods.
1.5.3. Key Human Interventions and Actors
(1) The role of the U.K. Environment Agency (ac-
torE) as the conduit for and applier of funding
from the central government (primarily DE-
FRA, actorG) is critical, and it plays a key part
in deciding on the relative expenditures on, for
example, dredging versus pumping versus tidal
barrage expenditure, both short and medium
term.
(2) Media (actor M) including local and national
radio, television, and print journalists in con-
junction with local population (actor L) are
clearly influential in the raising of government
and the general public’s (actor P) awareness of
the situation, setting, indirectly, the short-term
political agenda and influencing the long-term
agenda in conjunction with E and G.
(3) Local farmers (actor F) as a subset of L have
a specific interest in soil management vis-a`-
vis dredging or barrage solutions. Protective of
their existing farming practices, this group fa-
vors dredging solutions over others and has the
support of the National Farmers’ Union.
(4) Disruptive elements (actorD) such as the loot-
ers and vandals (February 3 and 22) have some
influence over police intervention policy and
practice.
(5) Environment Agency and other scientists (ac-
tor S) influence the quality of debate, particu-
larly that surrounding the dredging issues.
1.5.4. Policy Issues Emerging from the Chronology
The management of such a situation, not surpris-
ingly, is dominated by a series of policy conflicts that
in retrospect (although not at the time) are relatively
easy to see.Many of the policy choices inevitably cen-
ter on the deployment of resources in the short term,
for example, whether emergency staff (such as army
personnel) should be deployed in preventive duties
such as drain clearance or in humanitarian activity
such as evacuation or road clearance.
There is a clear policy choice to be made over the
extent to which central government funds should be
deployed into an emergency, at risk of depleting the
availability of such resources for future unexpected
events.
The two most striking policy dilemmas in the
Somerset Levels flood crisis were the clear and pub-
lic disagreement over the extent to which dredging
the main waterways was the key to flood control and
the tension between local demands for action vis-
a`-vis the apparent inaction of central government.
Accepted local wisdom, evidenced by years of in-
tensive dredging, was that the key intervention for
flood prevention was to keep clear the main water-
ways, carrying runoff from the farmlands.(73,74) There
is evidence, however, that these “system inhabitants”
had been “offered false hope due to the lack of sci-
ence and evidence to support claims that widespread
dredging alone can act as a flood prevention
measure.”(72) In contrast, there is significant evidence
that the major cause of flooding was not the capac-
ity of the drainage waterways so much as the effect
of tidal range, increasing the blocking effect at the
outlet of these waterways, indicating a preferred pol-
icy of expenditure on tidal barriers and pumping.(72)
Nevertheless, social pressures from inhabitants re-
sulted in immediate dredging becoming part of the
20-year action plan. Moreover, “[d]redging of the
rivers Tone and Parrett had the potential to cause
increased flood risk downstream, in particular to
Bridgewater. The increased confluence downstream
combined with high tides were expected to cause in-
creased water depths, and possible overbank flow at
points where not previously experienced.”(72)
In respect of the policy dilemma over funding,
there are two components. First is the straightfor-
ward securing of funding, whereby the Environment
Agency was accused of failing to secure funding from
DEFRA. This was, understandably, the basis of at-
tempted political escalation by the inhabitants and
FLAG, the local action group. Second was the effect
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of local feeling that it was only when the Thames Val-
ley became flooded in February, that action on the
ground in the Levels became sufficiently high on the
policy agenda.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is tempting to
think that these dilemmas or policy conflicts should
have been obvious to the system owners, be they
disaster managers or policymakers, but the chronol-
ogy of the Floods shows that, rather than being
identified at an early stage in the development of the
disaster, they emerged unexpectedly at the point of
conflict.(75) A good example of this is the (perhaps
unreasonable) irritation of Somerset Levels inhabi-
tants that “action was only taken when the Thames
Valley flooded.” If this had been identified as a
potential cause for conflict, action could have been
taken in the social and policy subsystems to attenu-
ate the feeling of inequity and avoid significant press
and media involvement of a negative nature.(76,77)
1.6. Modeling Approach: QPID
In strategic systems studies, there is a small set
of existing techniques to clarify the interactions of
HAs with the equivalent of our infrasystem, the
most common being SSM(21) and SODA.(78) While
these have the advantages of familiarity and indeed
inform an extensive body of praxis on which to
draw, both have the disadvantage in this application
of a dislocation from the specific processes of the
system in focus. Since, in our view, the process of
risk identification needs to be closely related to the
specific system processes (almost certainly using
such broad methods as SSM as a precursor in system
design) we adopt the methodology of system dynam-
ics in its qualitative form(79,80) and in particular the
methodology of QPID,(44–46) which attaches HAs,
by elicitation from informants in focus groups, to
specific system processes.
The process is a simple one. Fig. 1 shows a
typical dynamic loop extracted from an influence
diagram using the method detailed previously.(44)
It represents a particular chain of causality where
the drainage capacity (here voiced as capacity for
runaway) is affected by the ability of the farmland
to absorb water (surface porosity of farmland). On
farmland, the soil is often compressed by heavy farm
machinery or livestock, which reduces the porosity.
Consequently, the infiltration capacity is decreased
and leads to poor drainage capacity. The effects of
“hardscape,” of significance in more urban environ-
ments, are of minimal effect at this stage of devel-
Fig. 1. Typical loop extracted from ID (showing effects of reduced
surface porosity dynamics).
opment of this largely rural context, although over a
longer timescale they may become of importance, to
the extent that urban development of the area is al-
lowed. The loop is closed by the linkage between the
propensity of the land to flood (voiced as duration of
flooding) and its desirability for agriculture (fraction
of soil to agriculture). It must be stressed that Fig.
1 captures only one of a series of interconnecting
and often conflicting mechanisms, which, working in
conjunction, result in the overall system outputs.
The QPID extension deployed here attaches
agents and groups of agents to the causal arrows
constituting the dynamic loops, again through expert
focus groups. Although in some cases there will
be many hundreds or even thousands of dynamic
loops (the topology of loops being combinatorial
with respect to the number of variables), the process
of attaching coded agents to the causal arrows is
less onerous, since the number of causal links in a
diagram is at worst polynomial (N2) with respect to
the number of variables (N).
1.6.1. Analysis of QPID Diagrams
The process of analysis of the risk contribution
of the HAs proceeds as follows:
(1) Selection of significant dynamic loops for ex-
amination, together with the desired behavior
of that loop as judged by the system owner
(2) Attribution of HAs to each arrow of each loop
chosen for analysis
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Fig. 2. Full ID for Somerset Levels.
(3) Establishment of the relation of each HA to
the process or processes underlying the causal
connection implicit in the arrow
(4) Establishment of the motivation of each HA in
that relation
(5) Establishment of the capacity of the agent to
disrupt or fail to support the system owner’s
motivated outcome
(6) Declaration of the threats and risks carried by
the agents in respect of the arrow
(7) The options for risk mitigation or management
associated with that agent (if any)
(8) The appropriate actions by the system man-
ager/owner for risk control
(9) The resource implications of those actions
An additional practical step is the identification
of residual risks remaining after mitigation or control
action has been completed.
We illustrate the process by an analysis of part
of an extensive QPID diagram of the flooding in late
2013–early 2014 of the Somerset Levels in the south-
western United Kingdom.
1.7. Illustrative Example—Flood Threat to the
Somerset Levels 2013/2014
Fig. 2 shows the full ID of the illustrative ex-
ample of the flood threat to the Somerset Levels,
a low-lying flood plain situated in the southwest
of the United Kingdom, which, during winter
2013/2014, was subject to catastrophic flooding
during an episode of extreme rainfall and storm
conditions that caused severe resource demands
over the entire United Kingdom. The severity of
the situation caused inevitable local, regional, and
national political conflicts of policy, press interest,
and a combination of socially defined feelings of
isolation, economic dysbenefit, and personal risk,
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Fig. 3. Loops 2 and 3.
illustrating the relevance to the risk identification
and management task of the three submodels of Fig.
1, each of which is represented in the full QPID of
Fig. 2.
The influence diagram of Fig. 2, although rel-
atively uncomplicated in system dynamics terms
(many IDs comprise upwards of 50 variables), cap-
tures key dynamics inherent in the case description,
such as the long-term effects of soil management,
medium-term effects of run-away capacity manage-
ment, and short-term effects of political pressures re-
sulting in the release of centrally held resources, such
as pumps and manpower.
Fig. 1 shows the soil management loop. As the
fraction of soil to agriculture (and hence the degree
of soil compaction) increases (reducing the extent
of open, porous surface area) the capacity for run-
away decreases (the arrow is dotted, indicating neg-
ative correlation), not because of any effect of the
conveyance of relief water channels, but because of
the integrated, distributed effect of a reduction in the
ability of the land surface to absorb and gradually
release rainfall. As a result, the average water level
increases, and because the duration of flooding year
on year increases, the propensity of farmers to put
land to agriculture will decrease. The loop of Fig. 1,
then, is a goal-seeking loop, in that an arbitrary in-
crease in one variable (say the amount of land put to
agriculture) will produce an effect that ripples round
the causal loop, but that dies out. It must be remem-
bered that there will be exogenous factors also at
play, which will affect the variables and hence the
loop behavior. For example, the motivation of farm-
ers to put unused land to agriculture will be affected
by the economic pressures on them. In addition, from
an overall system perspective, the behavior of loops
such as that of Fig. 1 cannot be understood in isola-
tion, since, as examination of Fig. 2, the full ID, will
show, there are other dynamic mechanisms that af-
fect its component variables, for example, through
the variable capacity for runaway, which can, in the
short term at least, be increased by emergency pump-
ing and (although contentiously) by dredging.
We can see this in the two loops contained in
Fig. 3.
The left-hand loop 2 describes a medium-term
effect, whereby, as the flooding of the region in-
creases in duration, the local (deleterious) economic
effect increases. Inhabitants begin to lose agricultural
productivity, trade decreases because of the diffi-
culty of travel, and so on. As a result, public pres-
sure (local) rises. Residents demand action, which
raises the regional political support for intervention;
politicians react to public pressure. To the extent that
the regional authorities have access to deployable
resources and emergency resources available locally,
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Fig. 4. Loop 4 accelerating effect of local disaffection.
they are deployed, increasing the capacity for run-
away (e.g., by improved pumping) and this reduces
the average water level, eventually assuaging the ef-
fects on the local economy.
Loop 3 (also in Fig. 3) captures a similar mech-
anism, linking human agency with the infrasystem of
drainage and water levels, but is of a much shorter
time constant in that the rise of public fear for phys-
ical safety will be faster than the corresponding vari-
able in loop 2, the local (deleterious) economic effect
of sustained flooding.
Similar loops that link the public reaction to the
provision of resources through the local, regional,
and national political mechanisms can be extracted
from Fig. 2.
Two striking factors emerge from consideration
of the Somerset Levels case, namely:
 The effect of continuing insistence by inhabi-
tants that the optimal palliative measure was
dredging in the face of expert analysis to the
effect that the main causes of water level rise
were increased agricultural use exacerbated by
the downstream presence of an exit blockage
due to the huge tidal range (>14 m at spring
tide) of the Bristol Channel.
 The (perceived) slowness of response to the ex-
tended crisis in the Levels until the Thames
Valley, closer to the seat of power in London,
experienced similar floods. Suddenly, the politi-
cal importance of the weather events increased,
making available substantial emergency and
medium-term resources, not only in the Thames
Valley but in the Levels as well.
The first of these prominent effects can be seen
in loop 4 (Fig. 4).
Here we see that as public pressure (local) in-
creases, national political support for intervention
rises (inhabitants would attest that the rise was not
sufficiently fast). As a result, emergency resources
(pumping and humanitarian relief) were applied.
Counterintuitively, however, because of the exist-
ing unchallenged assumptions that the solution was
dredging, the appearance of the pumps was seen
as “evidence” that the dredging activity was insuffi-
cient (since more pumps were needed). Hence pub-
lic disaffection increased, putting more pressure on
national authorities. The political conversation re-
mained distorted by the presence of the assumption
of the efficacy of dredging vis-a`-vis longer-term and
downstream ameliorations.
Fig. 5 (containing loop 5) throws some light on
the effect of the Thames Valley floods, which (at least
in the eyes of the inhabitants of the Levels) precipi-
tated a long overdue response.
The Thames Valley events and the fast-rising
water levels, highly visible at the time on television
and in print media, created a feeling of fear of phys-
ical safety nationally (not least because the events
took place within commuting distance of the U.K.
Parliament). This raised the national political profile
of flooding in general and hence of national politi-
cal support for intervention in the preexisting Levels
problem. Emergency response teams were provided
not only to the Thames Valley, but to the Somer-
set Levels as well. To the extent that the interven-
tions were effective in reducing water levels, (na-
tional) public concern fell and political pressure was
reduced.
We can see, then, that the ID of Fig. 2 contains
the significant dynamics to be drawn from the earlier
case-based description of the Levels flooding events.
We now proceed to an agent-based analysis of this
model.
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Fig. 5. Loop 5: effect of national pressure.
1.8. HA Analysis
Having identified the significant dynamic loops
in the normal manner for a qualitative SD model
(i.e., by inspection, possibly supported by additional
numerical modeling), the QPID analysis(44) then at-
taches agents to the arrows of each loop.We use as an
example loop 01 in Fig. 2, which captures the effects
of land use versus short-term flooding effects through
surface porosity degradation. This loop is strong in
effect but rather slow in action, in that the transfer of
land from fallow ground (or set-aside) to agricultural
use takes place over a season at minimum.
Fig. 3 contains a key to the agents who affect the
strengths of the arrows constituting the dynamic loop
of Fig. 2, and hence the overall system output.
It should be noted that the attachment of an
agent to an arrow denotes that the agent in question
has a direct influence over the strength or polarity
of the connection. Sometimes, that influence can be
very direct (for example, the farmer F in the arrow
duration of flooding →fraction of soil to agriculture)
or indirect (for example, the agronomist A on the
same arrow giving authoritative advice to that farmer
on land usage). Moreover, agents may have differ-
ent strengths of influence one from another, and may
have different strengths of effect in different parts of
the system.
The attachment of agents to causal arrows is
often more conveniently done in a tabular fash-
ion as in the example of Table III for the loop of
Fig. 6. The tabulation of risks seen in Table III is
performed for all significant loops in the ID. This
can be a time-consuming process, but in practice
no more so than the time available, since loops
can be prioritized according to speed of action and
power (by which we mean the degree of influ-
ence of a particular loop upon significant system ef-
fect, this varying from stakeholder to stakeholder).
The order of priority will, in general, be STRONG
+ FAST, WEAK + FAST, STRONG + SLOW,
and lastly SLOW + WEAK. In some cases, simu-
lation can be used to mobilize whatever quantita-
tive data are available, but general managerial prac-
tice has shown that it is relatively easy to identify
the appropriate loops for analysis by inspection and
through tacit knowledge of the significant systems
dynamics.
Completion of the table follows by considera-
tion of each agent in respect of his or her connec-
tion with a specific causal element or arrow. Each ar-
row is taken in turn, and the motivations and capac-
ity of each potential actor considered to specify the
actor’s role in respect of that particular arrow, bear-
ing in mind that an actor’s capacity to action can be
very different in one mechanism from another. Gen-
erally, an actor’s system-level motivation will remain
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Fig. 6. Dynamic loop with agents attached.
constant from one mechanism to another, although
the local interpretation and reification of that moti-
vation in the specific mechanism may vary.
 Column 2 captures the relation of the agent to
the causal mechanism, i.e., the nature of the
contribution to the mechanisms. For example,
in Table III row 1 the farmer (F) has control
over the usage of the land, but of course is
limited in this by planning and other legal and
nonlegal constraints. Some crops are forbidden,
some are uneconomic, some are contributory to
run-off dynamics, some are not.
 Column 3 expresses the perceivedmotivation or
motivations of the agent in respect of the partic-
ular causal mechanism under consideration. It is
this adjacency between the agent and the com-
ponent of the system operation, as distinct from
any aggregated judgement, that allows the pro-
posed method to identify specific risk and threat
mechanisms. The motivations may, of course,
be multiple, even apparently conflicting, reflect-
ing, perhaps, some moral hazard or straightfor-
ward conflicts of objective.
 Column 4 details the extent to which the actor
in question can affect that particular causal link,
often elucidating the mechanism of effect. For
example, in the case of F in row 1 of Table III,
the decision to plant particular crops, will, in
part, determine the run-off characteristics, the
irrigation regime needed, and, to some extent,
the soil structure itself. It should be noted that
the capacity to affect is limited to the particu-
lar causal mechanism (i.e., the arrow) in ques-
tion. Any potential for F to affect other parts
of the system (e.g., downstream hydraulic ef-
fects through effective ditch maintenance) will
appear in that part of the system diagram rel-
evant to that mechanism. Again, the specificity
of the approach allows precise threat and risk
identification.
 Column 5 identifies the specific risks emerging
from the content of columns 1 to 4. The moti-
vation of the actor, coupled with the capacity
for effect, leads to identification of a particu-
lar risk, here that the farming community will
act so as to maintain shorter-term economic re-
turn rather than adopting a more strategic view.
This is not to say that this risk will be reified, be-
cause the mitigating and control mechanisms of
column 6, and indeed other system mechanisms
acting to moderate such an approach, may come
into play. Nevertheless, in terms of risk identifi-
cation, the interaction of actor with mechanism
under assumptions of motivation and subject to
limitations of effect lead to clear HA risk speci-
fication.
1440 Powell et al.
Table IV. Key Dilemmas in the Somerset Levels Case
Topic Thesis Antithesis Actors
Soil management vs.
dredging(72)
Flooding is caused by poor
soil management
Flooding is caused by lack of free
drainage through the Tone +
Parrett
Farmers
Environmentalists
DEFRAa
Dredging vs. long-term
area management(72)
Flooding is caused by
backup from tidal effects
exacerbated by climate
change
Flooding is caused by lack of free
drainage through the Tone +
Parrett
Farmers
Planners
DEFRA
Resource allocation Resources should be
deployed to Somerset
Levels
Resources should be deployed to
Thames Valley
DEFRA
Press
House of Commons (HoC)
Sources of funding Local funding Government funding Local government
HoC
EAb
DEFRA
Long vs. short term Long-term savings Short-term investment Local government
EA
DEFRA
a(U.K.) Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
b(U.K.) Environment Agency.
1.9. Effectiveness of Procedure
The benefit of the process encapsulated in
Table I is in its discipline and in the specific at-
tribution of the HA’s motivation and capacity to
specific system mechanisms. An explicit system
description is deployed, leading to declared as-
sumptions of the key system dynamics.(1) The key
step in terms of identifying the risks either deriving
from or substantially controlled by the HAs is in
the exhaustive declaration of each agent’s interest
in the step-by-step operation of each loop. This is
undoubtedly onerous; establishing a viable ID for
a typical CHAS requires around three sessions of
about three hours each for a team of, for example,
four informants and a facilitator. Subsequent loop
analysis takes about one day of a single analyst’s
time. The tabulation of risk (qua Table I) requires
around two hours for each loop with the attendance
of sufficient representation to allow well-founded
conjectures to be made about the motivations and
likely behavior of absent stakeholders. Thus, if we
assume around 10 significant loops in the ID, a typ-
ical initial human agency risk analysis for a CHAS
would entrain some 170 man-hours, or around 20
man-days. This is entirely consistent with the wholly
appropriate but substantial resource allocated to risk
and threat identification by conventional means.
Against this must be measured the utility. The
ability to identify in an auditable way the risks
involved in a situation, particularly in advance of
occurrence of a crisis, is potentially of considerable,
albeit inestimable, benefit. Of particular benefit to
decisionmakers is the identification of the implica-
tions of action dilemmas, by which we mean multiple
options for action, each of which presents obvious
and planned benefits but unexpected, usually unde-
sirable disadvantages. The decisionmaker must then
choose between these policy options (usually, but
not always presented in pairs). The ability to make
sound conjectures about these ancillary outcomes
is valuable in its own right, particularly regarding
unexpected outcomes. It is a strength of the system
approach to risk that it is more likely to adumbrate
unexpected risks than the essentially linear causal
analysis of conventional approaches.
A good example of a simple dilemma is shown
in the present case where we compare the effects
of loops 2 (or 3) and 4. In the former case (Fig. 3),
the effect of emergency provision is as anticipated;
pumping machinery arrives, the water level drops,
and, equivalently, economic trading is reestablished
(loop 2) or, more dramatically, the inhabitants of the
Levels feel less threatened by the flooding (loop 3).
What is of value to the risk manager of the situa-
tion, however, is the recognition of the less desirable
dynamics of loop 4 (Fig. 4). Because of the imma-
nent assumptions of the inhabitants about the need
for dredging as the primary solution of the problem,
the arrival of the emergency measures is seen as sup-
porting the case that dredging is insufficient, for (they
argued) if the dredging is sufficient, why would emer-
gency pumping equipment be needed?
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Other dilemmas in the Levels case are shown in
Table IV.
Examples of such action dilemmas occur in the
management of many CHASs. They are, for exam-
ple, characteristic of the class of problems known as
reputation crisis management where, as in the case of
the well-known Toyota product failure of 2009, a se-
ries of unexpected outcomes can emerge from what,
at the time, seem perfectly reasonable responses to
events. The unexpectedness of the outcomes in the
Toyota case, as in the case of the flooding reported
here, came primarily from human intervention.
This human intervention is not always based
on a rational foundation, but it does us no good as
managers of CHASs to reject bounded, localized, or
even defective rationality on the part of the system
inhabitants any more than it helps to bemoan the
limits presented by laws of nature, geography, or
the inevitability of the passage of time. In managing
CHASs an awareness of the possibility of dilemmas
arising, of the possible mixed effects of unconsid-
ered intervention, and, above all, the presence of
human-derived risks seems a wise insurance against
exacerbating rather than improving the crisis. The
human agency analysis presented here is of some
assistance in mobilizing system knowledge in iden-
tifying dilemmas and in addressing the sources and
consequent mitigation of human-derived risk.
1.10. Extensions to the Procedure and Future Work
An extension to the approach described here
would be to include more explicitly the effect of time
delays in the operation of the causal effects captured
in the ID. This is common practice in SD work,(44)
with the convention (in qualitative IDs) that a causal
link subject to significant delay in its operation has a
 sign attached to it.(81) This is a useful convention
and indeed consideration of the speed of operation
of a dynamic mechanism is of importance in two
respects. The first is the rather obvious observation
that its consideration allows a potential policy to
be assessed as to the timeliness of its response;
this allows a judgment to be made, particularly in
time-dependent crisis situations, whether the effect
desired will be achieved in an acceptable timescale.
The second respect is that consideration of the time
constant of operation of a dynamic mechanism under
consideration for policy attention serves, together
with the predicted magnitude of its effect, as a dis-
tinguishing factor for whether that mechanism can
be considered strategic vis-a-vis operational. This
allows a prioritization of response considerations.
It is a general view that the ordering of treatment
of dynamic mechanisms should be Fast+Strong:
Slow+Strong: Fast+Weak: Slow+Weak,(44) and
under the common constraint of time pressure in
disaster planning, such a prioritization throws up the
more powerful and timely action responses to the ex-
igencies of the (now ordered) dynamic mechanisms.
Perhaps surprisingly, at least in its qualitative
form, the assessment of the speed of operation of a
particular dynamic mechanism is relatively easy, so
long as the constructor of the ID has sufficient holis-
tic appreciation of the system in focus. This is implicit
in the content of Table III, but could be included as
an extra column.
Issues of complacency, deliberate delay (includ-
ing resource unavailability), and information delays
including time to decision or process delays can also
be incorporated in the overall consideration of time
constants in this way.(81) It should be noted, however,
that the representation of time constant of operation
and information delays are notoriously problematical
in quantitative representations.(79)
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